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From Elitist  
To  
Popular Representation1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Drawing conclusions from the research project about “Problems and Options 
of Democratisation in Post-New Order Indonesia” (2003-2005), the conference on 
democratisation held in Jakarta on 24-26 November 2005 confirmed the emergence of 
four signs of the state of democratisation in Indonesia: (1) Democracy deficit, (2) 
Oligarchic democracy; (3) Pseudo-representation; (4) Marginalisation of pro-democracy 
groups.2 Yet, it also recognised some progress, such as the establishment of new space 
for civil and political freedom. Based on those findings, the conference’s participants 
identified some formulations to breakthrough the stagnant democratic process and 
formulated some urgent agendas to be conducted.  
 The participants, who included academicians, activists and journalists, realised 
that, although the democracy process had been stagnant, there was no reason to 
abandon the democracy process in Indonesia as if it is not suitable with Indonesian 
society. They, however, did not entirely believe that progress happened by itself. Some 
problems needed to be solved, particularly those in regard to citizen’s equality; law and 
justice restoration; supremacy of law and justice, social, cultural and economical rights 
guarantee; representation and the availability of committed agents to perform people’s 
mandate. 
 Every attempt to resolve the problems of democratisation require the 
participation of political progressive actors. More than that, they were expected to 
increase political capacity by extending their basis and politicising their issues and 
                                               
1 This draft is an integrated report of a series of topical researches under the theme of “Strengthening 
Popular Representation” conducted by Demos in 2006-2007. This draft is written by AE Priyono, 
Antonio Pradjasto and Willy Purna Samadhi. In addition to having directed the research, Olle 
Tornquist reports on his own supplementary project and has taken part in drafting the final 
conclusions. 
2 The arguments of these four points had been discussed in the book of “Toward Meaningful 
Democracy” (Jakarta: Demos, 2006) of which revised editions will be published in mid-April 2007. 
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interest in order to gain strong political legitimacy and to compete with dominant elite 
groups monopolising and hijacking the available democracy instruments. 
 
 The conference also formulated the following agendas to resolve the problems 
and to increase the political capacity of pro-democracy actors: 
1. Establishing a political platform for democracy 
2. Linking the relationship between formal political and social movements. 
3. Reforming democratic law and institutions so that they are able to guarantee 
the fulfilment of both civil and politic rights as well as social, economical and 
cultural rights. 
 
What Has Been Done and Why 
 Following up the conference’s recommendations, Demos has planned a 
programme that combines research- and advocacy activity. The scheme programme 
includes three kinds of activities: 
1. Research to map the problems and options of strengthening popular 
representation, which is conducted through the topics of: 
a. Reconnection of social movements with political action (Link Project) 
that focused on the problems and options to link social movements with 
political movement, including transforming social movements to 
political movements, by conducting eleven case studies in 7 provinces. 
b. Experiences from participation of pro-democracy actors in Pilkada: This 
project focused on the problems and options of the participation of pro-
democracy actors in Pilkada by picking 3 case studies in 3 regencies and 
one general study in Aceh. 
c. Legal reform: focused on problems and options of legal reform 
(constitution and regulation) to create legal basis for the efforts to 
reform popular representation. 
2. Research and efforts to establish a network of local democracy watch groups by 
trying out instruments for participatory democracy-assesment in five cities in 
Indonesia (Medan, Pekalongan, Banjarmasin, Palu, Manggarai/Ruteng). A 
similar activity is also conducted in all cities/municipalities in Aceh. Based on 
those experiments and improved tools, pro-democracy activists in other places 
may hopefully be able to conduct similar activities independently, so that they 
can develop and analyse a sufficient basis of knowledge to formulate local 
democratisation agenda. 
3.  Building and extending networks and publication activities to coordinate and 
support other activities. 
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We now work on the final report of each activity.3 This integrated report serves as our 
initial response to the conference’s recommendation which underlie the 
implementation of these researches. Therefore, this report will present data and early 
analysis of the researches which particularly concern with: 
a. The description of the connection of social movement with organised 
political movement; 
b. The description of attempts on building minimum platform in 
democracy movement. 
c. The description of legal and institutional reform to promote democracy 
process. 
d. Comparative perspectives on the problems and options of scaling up and 
building democratic representation. 
 
Finally, this report will present the researches’ general conclusion and general ideas 
which may serve as a basis for future recommendation to formulate the follow ups to 
build real popular representation. 
 
TOPICAL RESEARCHES 
 
1. LOCAL DEMOCRACY WATCH 
 
Building survey’s instruments: Why Needed? 
 
Demos’ survey in 2003-2005 describes situation of democratisation in Indonesia. This 
survey comprised the assessment of 798 expert-informants who were all pro-
democracy activists in Indonesia. The survey has already been disseminated through 
several discussions and publication activities. 4 In general, the finding has so far 
received positive response. In other words, the survey may have successfully captured 
the prominent signs of the process of democratisation. 
There is one question raised then: is the survey’s instrument also useful to study the 
local processes of democratisation? It does not mean that we are ‘worried’ that the 
former instruments contained variables that can only be applied in national level. Yet, 
the question is raised to follow up the result and recommendation of the survey that 
                                               
3 We expect to complete each research’s final report by the beginning of May 2007. The final report will 
be possible to access through Demos’ website (http://www.demosindonesia.org) 
4 Not only being presented in several discussions in Jakarta and other regions in Indonesia, the survey’s 
findings were also serially published in Tempo magazines, October 2004 to August 2005. 
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democracy movement should grow from ‘below’ or local level. The creation of 
democracy by the elites at national level only creates democracy as a series of 
procedures or rules, which are undoubtedly  important but not sufficient enough to 
bring significant change.   
One important requirement to generate a process of democratisation from ‘below’ is, 
therefore, the availability of information on the situation and problems of 
democratisation at local level.  Demos have aimed at initiating the development of a 
tool to conduct local participatory surveys to provide the necessary information. In 
the future, therefore, the tools to carry out democracy watch studies can also be 
applied in other local contexts. Hopefully, the local pro-democracy activists may be 
able to use the survey instrument that is specially designed for assessing democracy at 
local level, without depending to Demos or other institutions in Jakarta. In the end, 
they are expected to formulate recommendation and to take initiative in promoting 
democratisation process in their own regions. 
 
Trying-out the instruments 
In order to realise the idea, Demos has designed survey instruments that are expected 
to watch local democratisation process accurately. The instruments are the 
modification of national survey’s instrument. Some are simplified, some are more 
detailed.  
To begin, Demos have applied the instruments in five cities/municipalities in 
Indonesia, i.e Medan (North Sumatera), Pekalongan (Central Java), Banjarmasin (South 
Kalimantan), Palu (Central Sulawesi) and Manggarai/Ruteng (Nusa Tenggara Timur), 
to explore their capabilities and weaknesses. In addition, this activity was also useful to 
collect actual information of the situation and condition of democratisation in the 
regions. 
The following is the description of some important findings of these democracy watch 
studies. 
 
Reconnection to Political Action: Looking for Ideal Format 
Different from our previous research result, our survey in the five cities shows the 
initiative of pro-democracy actors to engage on political activity and entering state’s 
politics. This trend may indicate the growth of new awareness among the pro-
democracy actors to come out from their ‘traditional’ area, i.e civil society area. Some 
discussions with informants, however, indicate that this new trend also creates 
problems. Some pro-democracy activists are suspicious to their own colleagues who 
attempt to build productive relationship with political organisation and movement. 
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Besides, the pro-democracy actors who enter the political sphere seem to compete to 
win chances.5 
The information we gained from five cities show that 40 percents of the local main 
actors who tend to use and promote democratic instruments, are those who have 
influence or get actively involved in political parties. Almost a similar number of 
actors participates also in local government. It is true that their proportion is smaller 
compared to their activity in interest based organisation and lobby groups. Yet, by 
considering the number of them who actively involve in political parties and local 
government, we can assume that their lobby is also intended to influence political 
parties and local government. See Table 1.   
 
Table1: Political Terrains of Main Actors (combined data of five cities) 
 Political terrain 
Business 
and 
industries 
 
Small 
business 
 
Self-
managed 
units 
Lobby 
groups 
Interest 
organisations
 
Political 
parties 
 
Local 
elected 
government 
The 
bureaucracy 
The 
judiciary Military 
No Main actor background 
 (% of for each actors group in each region) 
1 
Use and 
promote 
(N=212) 
12 18 21 42 47 40 37 29 9 12 
2 Use (N=152) 22 7 10 41 34 55 42 35 5 12 
3 Abuse (N=39) 33 10 0 41 15 49 54 49 3 28 
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Avoid 
(N=26) 
42 8 0 42 31 46 27 38 4 15 
Percentages based on the number of main actors in each category. Each informant could choose maximum three options for each 
main actor. 
 
Comparing this result with previous Demos’ findings, we will find a contrast 
description. In the National survey conducted by Demos 2 – 3 years ago, we found 
that pro-democracy actors avoided state arenas. It is true that they were not completely 
absent in the arenas, but they concentrated more in the activities occurred in non-state 
arenas, such as in self-managed units or civil society organisations. 
Yet, as seen in Table 2, the shift of such trend does not evenly happened. NGO 
activists, for example, seem to be reluctant to involve in political parties. According to 
our informants, only 13 percents of the actors who have NGO background apply their 
movement in political parties, and 17 percents in local governments. The number is 
quite small compared to the number of NGO’s activists who work in self-managed 
units. Most of them work in interest based organisations and lobby groups. On the 
                                               
5 For instance, Dedi, an activist working with Walhi in South Kalimantan and also on of Demos’ 
informants in Banjarmasin, stated “ Some activists are now active in politics by entering political party. 
Yet, it is triggered by more personal motivation and is not done openly. Therefore, we doubt to support 
them. Soon after they enter the system, our communication is directly cut.” Interview in Banjarmasin, 
12 November 2006. 
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contrary, activists with the background of labour/peasant/fishermen union are more 
progressive in entering state politics arenas 
 
Table 2: Political terrain of main actors with NGO and Labour/Peasant/Fishermen Union Background 
(combined data of five regions) 
 Political terrain 
Business 
and 
industries 
Small 
business 
 
Self-
managed 
units 
Lobby 
groups 
Interest 
organisations
 
Political 
parties 
Local 
elected 
government 
 
The 
bureaucracy 
The 
judiciary Military 
No Main actor background 
 (% of for each actors group in each region) 
1 NGO activists (N=75) 1 16 37 45 55 13 17 15 9 1 
2 
Trade union 
activists/ 
Peasants/ 
Fishermen 
(N=16) 
6 13 6 19 94 31 56 6 13 0 
Percentages based on number of main actors in each category. Each informant may choose to maximum three options for each 
main actor. 
 
Attempts to link social activity to organised political movement are shown by the data 
on methods of power transformation employed by actors we collected later.  
42 percents of main actors who use and promote democracy instruments choose to 
participate in general election in order to gain people’s mandate. The description of 
this attempt can also be seen in other parts of this report, which describe the pro-
democracy actors participating in Pilkada. Beside, most of pro-democracy actors seem 
to be more opened by building good relations and contacts with some political figures 
through lobbying and dialogues. 
  
 
Table 3: How the main actors transform their sources of power (combined data of five regions) 
Main actors’ category based on relation to democracy 
instruments 
Use and 
promote Use Abuse Avoid 
No Ways to transform 
(% pada setiap kategori aktor) 
(% of actor category) 
1 Discursive activities 82 49 46 37 
2 Contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators 72 60 76 45 
3 Building networks and co-ord for joint activity 78 50 67 49 
4 Contacts and partnership with influential figures and experts 75 62 59 45 
5 Demonstrate collective and mass-based strength 41 39 62 33 
6 Economic self-sufficiency and co-operatives 18 11 5 9 
7 formal Negara  Gaining formal legitimacy 40 38 56 38 
8 Forceful official authority, coercion/power 14 17 29 31 
9 State budget, pro-market policies 19 21 24 44 
10 Patronage 26 21 36 24 
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11 Organising community base 48 31 40 32 
12 Popular mandate or getting elected 42 38 53 46 
Percentages based on number of main actors in each category. Each informant may choose to maximum three options for each 
main actor. 
 
 Once more, these data reflect pro-democracy actors’ growing interest to engage 
in political activity. On one hand, this is a good sign for the growth of better 
representation. Yet, it is important to note, that such sign may also lead to serious 
problems, such as fragmentation or competition among the pro-democrats in gaining 
political influence and power. Therefore, we need to consider other important factors 
to create better representation, which is the political platform of pro-democracy 
movement. 
 
 
 
Toward Joint-Issue: Starting to Work for General Ideas 
One important finding of Demos’ national survey is the fragmentation of pro-
democracy activists. The pro-democracy activists generally work on the specific, 
sectoral, single issued base, without any awareness to build stronger network among 
various movement to build more comprehensive and ideology-oriented platform. In 
addition, the fragmentation also happens between national based and local based 
movements. 
Our latest local survey – in city/municipality level - shows the change of certain 
tendencies. Local actors who tend to use and promote democratic instruments seem to 
depart from the specific issue and single interest based movements. Some of them start 
to base their activities on certain concepts, general ideas and ideology. (see Table 4)  
 
Table 4. Policy character of main actors at local level (combined data 5 regions) 
Specific issues 
or interests 
Combination of 
several issues/ 
interests 
General 
concepts or 
ideas 
No data No 
Main actors’ category 
based on relation to 
democracy instruments 
(%) 
1 Use and promote 21 12 67 0 
2 Use 15 16 68 1 
3 Abuse 10 28 56 5 
4 Avoid 46 8 46 0 
Percentages based on number of main actors in each category. 
 
 
Examining the data of five different regions mentioned previously, we find that the 
change did not occur with the actors with background from labour/farmers/fishermen 
groups. Most of them still work on specific issues and single interest, as shown by 
Table 5. This is quite unfortunate, since they have the largest mass basis. If they only 
politicise single, specific issue and interest, especially those closely related to their own 
interest, they would not get wider public support. Thus, this problem may be one 
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explanation for why such mass-based organisations, together with their issues and 
interests, are marginalised and failed to involve in the wider political space.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Policy character of main actors’ group on local level (combined data of 5 regions) 
Specific issues 
or interests 
Combination of 
several issues/ 
interests 
General 
concepts or 
ideas 
 
No data No Main actors’ category based on background 
(%) 
1 Government/Bureaucracy (civil+military) 10 25 64 2 
2 NGOs, NGO activists 25 11 64 0 
3 Parliament members (central+local) 9 7 81 2 
4 Political parties, Politicians 0 16 84 0 
5 Religious leaders 18 5 77 0 
6 Academicians, Lawyers, Mass media 25 6 69 0 
7 
Non-class based mass 
organisations and its 
leaders 
38 0 54 8 
8 Businessmen 48 30 22 0 
9 Trade union activists/ Peasants/ Fishermen 81 13 6 0 
10 Adat leaders 18 27 55 0 
11 General trend 20 14 65 1 
Percentages based on number of main actors in each category. 
 
The data, however, indicate the tendency that local pro-democracy actors work in 
relation to more general issues. Therefore, we may expect some reduction of the 
fragmentation. In turn, we may also hope that this is the starting point of an 
agreement to build minimum platforms, which could serve as foundations to promote 
local democratisation process. Unfortunately, we still need to conduct further studies 
and to collect more accurate data on the type of general ideas that serve as a base got 
the movement of the local pro-democracy activists.  
Aside from that, the local pro-democracy activists, unfortunately, have not indicated 
better performance in regard to selecting methods to mobilise support for their 
movements. Although a great number (42%) of the main actors who use and promote 
democratic instruments integrated various popular organisations as their method to 
mobilise support, there are still 85% of them who rely on networks (which is more 
loose in nature). Most pro-democracy actors even choose to build popular and 
charismatic leadership rather than through organisational method. These data imply 
the long road to go before we see the growth of united local pro-democracy 
movements. (see table 6) 
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Table 6: Method of mobilisation of the main actors on local level (combined data of 5 regions) 
Popular and 
charismatic 
leaders 
Clientilism Alternative patronage Networks 
Integration 
popular 
organisations No 
 
Main actors’ 
category based on 
relation to 
democracy 
instruments 
(%) 
1 Use and promote 59 24 49 85 42 
2 Use 51 58 25 69 21 
3 Abuse 23 77 28 49 23 
4 Avoid 35 65 12 42 19 
Percentages based on number of main actors in each category. Informants can indicate one to maximum three options for each 
main actor. 
 
 
2. RESEARCH ON RECONNECTION OF CIVIL ACTIVITY TO 
POLITICAL ACTION (LINK PROJECT) 
From The Complex Situation of Democracy Deficit… 
The attempt of various civil society based social movements (NGO/PO) to go 
politics is underlain by the complex situation of democracy deficit both at local or 
national level. The civil movement’s activists in NGOs/POs generally realise their 
marginal position in the process of formal politics. They also realise that democratic 
governance’s instruments, including instrument of representation, have been used by 
oligarchic elites. On the other hand, they also believe that the only way to develop 
their political power and to change their socially floating position is by strengthening 
their popular representation basis.  
In regard to the background, the reconnection of civil activity to political 
action, in fact, becomes a series of civil repolitisation-experiments in order to build 
more democratic alternative representation. 
 
We notice the existence of various activities that can be categorised as political 
actions in eleven empirical cases experienced by several civil organisations we study in 
ten (10) provinces in Indonesia. The following Table 7 describes combinations of 
possible variations, with some illustrations and examples.  
 
Table 7: Variation of political activity’s model employed by civil organisations 
Political Activity Non-Party Based Party-Based 
Electoral Competition LSM coalition supporting DPD’s member 
nominee to represent province 
Cooperation of NGO and Political Party in 
Pilkada 
Non-electoral PO build alliance with NGO to strengthen 
CS’s political capacity 
Party builds basis in peasant organisations 
Using formal processes PO press DPRD to campaign certain policy Party-NGO alliance urge Governor on certain 
policy 
Informal NGO lobbies local politician on certain issue. Party-PO coalition to establish local political 
block. 
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Civil Repolitisation Emerges from Various Initiatives with Strong Local Basis 
One of our research findings on how NGO/PO based civil organisations 
establish connection with organised politics shows that initiative of repolitisation 
emerges through various agendas. Most of the agendas are local civil movements’ 
response to the specific local problems. Some others reflect the response to the general 
and national problems of democratisation.  
In regard to the fact, civil repolitisation movement seems to have strong local 
basis. They potentially serve as solid local blocks. Most of them base their movement 
on advocating marginal groups. Continuing their previous movement’s concentration 
on the civil society area, now civil movements work further to strengthen their 
political capacity. Their movements are in the middle of local politics process that is 
dominated by oligarchic power. This is the general situation faced by the movements.  
To this general conclusion, we have to add some points. First, our research has 
not yet provided enough data to depict the extent of civil movements’ evolution to 
political movement. Second, our research has a lack of data on the power constellation 
of NGO/PO based social movement in each local context’s power relation. 
Several patterns below, however, may describe the situation: 
 
(1)Intra-Local Reconnection: consolidating movement, strengthening social basis, but  
limiting  their geographical scopes. 
The repolitisation projects are employed by local civil society organisations either by 
their own initiative or by the intervention of NGO/CSO. They build organisations 
that represent specific issue and interest. Although there is a potency for them to 
transform their movement into solid political organisation in the next step and to have 
coalition with some political parties, they tend to limit their movements to certain 
scope.6 
(2) Local-Supra Local Reconnection: Horizontal cooperation to broaden issue and interest 
group. 
This second type of repolitisation project is directed to extended horizontal 
cooperation between local CSO/PO to broaden their  geographical scope in supra-
local level, for example from village to municipality (desa to kabupaten) even to 
                                               
6 INSAN, Germawan, KP3R and POR are the examples of this first pattern. Forum Warga is an 
exception since the initiative does not come from their local community. 
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province and inter-provinces. This geographical scope extension is also accompanied 
by issue and interest group extension.7 
 (3) National-Local Reconnection : the establishment of theme or class based party, vertical 
cooperation. 
In this type of reconnection, the idea of repolitisation comes from national level. The 
project also has national scope. This pattern usually rise from some consolidated 
NGO/CSO/PO  to build political block or national political party, either with class 
or thematic issue bases.8 Their experiments are efforts to build national political blocks 
that base on local civil organisations. In other words, they develop vertical 
reconnection to link local political project with similar national political projects.  
 
Developing Platform: Variety of  Repolitisation’s Themes and Agendas 
Although employing different agendas, repolitisation movements can be classified 
according to the themes of their movements:    
1. Resistance: By employing agenda to struggle on issues that directly connect with the 
constituent’s interest, this movement applies political resistance while consolidates 
itself to be political organisation that have strong bargaining position in local power 
network. One prominent example of organisation employing this theme is INSAN in 
Kotabaru, South Kalimantan. 
2. Revitalisation. Several agendas of “revitalisation” are employed by Jaringan Baileo 
(revitalisation of adat community), and FPH (revitalisation of lower class’/caste’s civil 
rights with the base of religious reform). These organisations’ experiments reflect the 
ideas of communitarianism, particularly in empowering local civil society. 
3. Reconstruction/Reform: The agendas of KORdEM, Forum Warga, Gemawan, 
ABPeDSI, dan KP3R aim to reconstruct and/or reform democratic policy and 
institution. Gemawan, KP3R and ABPeDSI give pressure to the institutions obliged to 
decide on public policy at local level, such as village heads and BPD. They employ 
direct political participation to influence, fill and even take over positions at local 
institutions. Forum Warga and KORdEM, on the other hand, concentrate on 
advocacy program to reform public policies to be more sensitive to marginal group’s 
interest. ABPeDSI even move further toward national consolidation to reform Law 
No. 32/2004, which is considered against the idea of rural autonomy. Working on the 
theme of reconstruction and reformation of policies and institutions seems to be a 
                                               
7 KORdEM/FPH and Jaringan Baileo’s cases show this experience. In the case of ABPeDSI, the 
extension of supra-local network goes up to national level, but their main issue (village autonomy) 
remained the same. 
 
8 PPR and BP3OPK are the examples of this type 
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logical step, in regard to their previous agenda on empowering civil society’s political 
capacity. 
4. Transformation.  BP3POK’s agenda to establish environmental issue-based green 
political block, or POR that raised the idea of political protection in empowering 
people’s economy, and the coalition of NGO/PO that base on agrarian issues to 
establish PPR are clearly some advance repolitisation experiments to transform civil 
organisation based social movement into political party. Such themes of 
transformation are employed according to each movement’s agenda. 
 
Building Experiment on Strengthening Alternative Representation 
The repolitisation experiments are actually efforts to strengthen democratic 
representation, whether we realise it or not. It also aims to prevent dominant problems 
in Indonesian democracy process, i.e. that pro-democracy actors are socially floating 
and politically marginal. Examining our research’s findings, we conclude that there are 
three types of experiments which aim to strengthen social basis:  
1. Substantive Representation. This is a form of social basis building based on  some 
actions to represent certain perspective, interests or ideas. Almost all of the examples 
of repolitisation presented previously represent attempts to fight for  certain 
ideas/perspectives and interests of one or several social groups. The movements vary 
on their platforms – fishermen’s interests in Kotabaru, marginal society’s interest in 
Bali, ideas on rural autonomy, economical interest of Melayu and Dayak ethnic groups 
in West Kalimantan, ideas on the need of green political block, ideas on the existance 
of representation basis of agrarian proletariat in political party. 
2. Descriptive Representation. The building of social bases to strengthen descriptive 
representation is actually efforts to represent certain geographical area, community or 
certain social groups. This type of experiment aims to protect adat community 
(Jaringan Baileo), caste (FPH), coastal Melayu community (Gemawan), Dayak 
community (POR), the province of Bali in DPD (KOR dEM). 
3. Symbolic Representation. The third representation model attempts to build social 
base which lies its basis upon cultural aspiration, belief and identity. The variation can 
be seen through the experiments to restore the social and adat norms employed by 
Jaringan Baileo, sampradaya movement by Pemuda Hindu in Bali, or Dayak and 
Melayu communitarianism in West Kalimantan.  
 
 
 
Toward the Shift of Political Movement’s New Social Basis. 
There has been an indication that repolitisation of NGO/PO-based civil 
organisation to connect with organised political movement will result on  a shift of the 
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political movement’s social bases. If formal politics has been considered as middle-class-
based with central-national concentration, the NGO/PO’s experiments may represent 
the opposite. 
If this phenomenon is proven to be the contemporary trend of political 
movement’s shift, then, post New Order Indonesia is experiencing a new major 
political movement trend , which is characterised by efforts to strengthen interest-
based mass politic in lower and middle classes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Empirical Model of Re-politisation Movements for the Development of Alternative Democratic Representation 
The Reform for Alternative Democratic Representation No. Movement 
Organisation 
The Specific Context 
of Repolitisation 
Triangular 
Reconnection 
The Platform of 
Politisation: 
Theme and 
Agenda  
Symbolic Descriptive Substantive 
1 INSAN Fishermen’s resistance to a 
mutinational company’s 
business operation which 
threatened their source of 
living 
Local PO activism and 
national NGO 
facilitation 
Resistance toward the 
strengthening of 
political capacity; front 
from below/ 
  Serve as an organisation which 
advocate fishermen’s interest, 
work on local legislation, 
fishermen protection and 
advocate on pro-fisherman law. 
2 Jaringan Baileo Resistance to illegal lodging, 
demand on recognition of 
adat rights and autonomy of 
adat community 
Coallition of local 
NGO/CSO with adat 
community; cooperation 
with party 
Revitalisation of adat 
community; front from 
below. 
Restoring identity 
basis and 
developing 
cultural/adat 
institution 
A network 
representing the 
interest of adat 
community in 
maluku. 
Representation of the interest of 
maluku’s local communities, 
especially adat communities. 
3 KORdEM Consollidation of civil 
organisation to advocate 
marginal society 
Political contract 
between local 
NGO/CSO with popular 
leader, lobby and 
pressure to party 
leaders and executive 
officers. 
Reconstruction of 
‘demos” and civil 
society political 
empowerment; front 
from below 
 Contributing vote 
to patron that run 
for DPD member 
election which 
represent Bali. 
Serve as reputable consortium to 
represent the interest of Bali’s 
marginal communities. 
4 Pemuda Hindu  
Strengthening the right of low 
caste, reinterpretation of 
caste doctrine, religious 
reform 
Local CSO and local-
national religious 
community (PHDI) 
Revitalisation of civil 
rights of religious based 
community; reform from 
within. 
 
Representing the 
identification of low 
caste subculture; 
reconstructing the 
identity of egalitarian 
Bali culture. 
 Represent interest,  ideas and 
perspective of jabowangsa’s 
community (the outcaste) 
5 ABPeDSI (dhi. 
FK-BPD Bantul) 
Participation of rural 
community in local public 
governance. 
Local CSO, local 
government, local 
parliament, national 
association of BPD. 
Reconstruction of 
rural community’s 
democracy institution; 
reform of law and public 
policy of rural 
community autonomy. 
  Represent the people’s ideas 
and aspiration on rural  
autonomy issue 
 
6 Gemawan Strengthening the political 
capacity and participation of 
rural community; economical 
empowerment, nomination of 
BPD and village mayor. 
Local NGO/CSO; 
village government, 
local government; party 
Rconstruction of rural 
civil community; 
increasing political 
participation; take over 
the democratic 
institutions. 
Representing 
melayu sub-culture 
in the West 
kalimantan society. 
Concern with the 
empowerment 
and politisation of 
Melayu-Pesisir 
community in four 
districts 
(kabupaten) 
 Represent the community’s idea 
and aspiration on rural 
autonomy, which is stressed on 
people’s role and participation. 
7 Forum Warga Strengthening public sphere National NGO, local Reconstruction of civil   Represent the interest of local 
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(dhi. Lakpesdam 
NU, Jepara) 
in rural community; the 
building of neighborhood 
organisation. 
CSO society in rural areas, 
related to civil rights for 
participation in public 
policy. 
rural community to make use of 
public spaces and the process of 
deliberative democracy. 
 
No. Movement 
Organisation 
The Specific Context 
of Repolitisation 
Triangular 
Reconnection 
The Platform of 
Politisation: 
Theme and 
Agenda  
The Reform for Alternative Democratic Representation 
8 BP3OPK-Walhi Building thematic political 
block on environmental issues 
National NGO, local 
CSO/PO, building 
green block politic with 
extended social basis. 
Transformation from 
NGO to be political 
organisation based on 
thematic issue of 
environment. 
  Represent pro-democracy 
political aspiration on the need of 
environmental based party, 
bottom-up formulated. 
9 POR – Yayasan 
Pancur Kasih 
Strengthening economical 
movement through political 
protection, political block 
building, party 
decentralisation. 
Local NGO 
collaborating with party 
Transformation from 
cooperation based 
social economic 
movement to local 
political power. 
Although not 
exclusively based on 
adat, this 
organisation attempt 
s to identify itself 
with Dayak culture. 
Work on political 
empowerment 
and education for 
Dayak-Traditional 
community as 
marginalised 
community. 
Represent ideas and aspiration 
on rural autonomy, through 
reforming rural governance 
system to be “kampung” 
governance system. 
10 PPR Building proletariat based 
party 
NGO/CSO/PO become 
political party 
Transformation from 
the coalition of 
NGO/PO/CSO to class 
based party 
 Preference on 
advocating 
marginalised 
people  
Represent the interest of 
peasants and agrarian labour, 
urban poor community and other 
marginal community. Attempt to 
bring these communities into 
political party mechanism. 
11 KP3R Strengthening the political 
capacity of village residents 
Local NGO and CSO 
collaborating with local 
PO 
Reconstruction of 
leadership institutions in 
rural areas 
   
  
3. RESEARCH ON THE PARTICIPATION OF PRO-DEMOCRACY 
ACTORS IN LOCAL ELECTION (PILKADA) 
 
Some pro-democracy actors had chosen local election (Pilkada) as their method 
to promote representation. This attempt is supported by several social movements 
with various reasons, including nurturing the raise of honest and clean leaders who 
recognise their native regions better and capable to struggle for people’s interest.  Some 
of the pro-democracy actors lost. Demos’ research, however, study the experience of 
them who won the election. In regard to their lack of experience9, of course, ’winning’ 
the competition is not the main aim. Victory does not mean prevailing power, 
considering the fact that the selected candidates did not always come from the party 
which win general election. This brings implication for the successful candidate to face 
the DPRD to struggle for the implementation of their public policy. Second, the 
bureaucracy is still dominated by incumbent so that the winning pro-democracy 
actors’ entire public policy agenda cannot be implemented.  
This experience, however, has some significance to: first, the possibilities to 
intervene social movement’s vision and agenda. Second, create important breakthrough 
amidst rent seeking politics which call for scepticism and cynicism to democracy in 
Indonesia. Third, create the possibilities to ’rent’ political vehicles, which in more than 
257 Pilkada, were dominated by figures who had big budget.10 Pilkada is an electoral 
instrument which allows the nomination of actors who are not cadres of political 
party.  
 
Establishing the link of social movement and political action 
Political parties are the only actors allowed to nominate candidates for regional 
heads. The formal requirement compels the pro-democracy movements to cooperate 
with political parties. On the other hand, some elections in municipality level show 
the potency of social movement to build alliance to collect support for candidates, in 
particular. Pilkada has created possibility for the mass based social organisations and 
non political organisation to negotiate platform with political parties. 
                                               
9 ORI’s reflection on support for Soekirman, for example, shows that the aim of political education has 
not yet achieved. Soekirman also stated that he decided to nominate himself in  the position of deputy 
because he considered himself inexperienced in formal politics.  
10 According to Law on Regional Governance (UU Pilkada), it is possible for actors who do not belong 
to certain political party to be candidates. 
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Yet, the real power of Pilkada does not lie in political parties, which seem not 
too significant in power accumulation. The ‘leader’ or party’s elites in DPP are more 
significant than party’s mechanism. It is possible because, though we have passed 
several presidential leadership since the fall of Soeharto (Habibie, Abdurahman Wahid, 
Megawati, SBY), political parties still rely on patronage system basis.11   Political 
parties only serve as the owner of political vehicles which require ‘rent payment’ . 
Demos’ research finding also demonstrates the lack of attempts to develop solid 
and organised strategies among mass based social movements and non political 
organisation in relating themselves with political parties Considering the fact on the 
dependence on ‘figures’, pro-democracy candidates have important roles to connect 
parties (organised political power) –non political organisation (information) – People 
Organisation (mass). Without solid strategy between mass organisation and non 
political organisation, actors can be politically marginalised again.  
 If there are experiments  to promote the involvement of people organisations 
in Pilkada, like what ORI and HAPSARi did, they as both organisation admitted, only 
served as instrument to measure the organisations’  political capacities. ORI stated that 
they had embraced 13 people organisations in Serdang Bedagai, Simalungun and 
Labuhan Batu – which include Serikat Pekerja Kebun (Plantation Labour Union), 
Serikat Nelayan Merdeka, Serikat Perempuan Independen and Solidaritas Perempuan. 
It is not enough to nominate and win the candidates. People organisations need to 
think on establishing autonomous power which is capable to interact, negotiate with 
and control either political party and nominated civil society ‘figure’.  
According to Demos’ researches, two of the candidates owned strong social 
basis but weak economy-political basis. Their strong social bases give significant 
contribution to their victory. To transform this strength into votes, the candidates 
mainly applied these strategies: 
(a) Establishing their own success team, out of that formed by their supporter parties. 
The team applied clear job-description, target and monitoring system; qualities rarely 
found in the political party’s success team, which often applied ineffective mechanism 
and owned different target and interest from those of the candidates. 
(b) Developing a door-to-door campaign model, which is considered more effective 
compared to mass campaign. This method is less money demanding, more appropriate 
with Pilkada which only involve hundred thousands voters and create the possibility 
to be more close to the constituents. 
 (c) Using social networks that are able to reach voters. The existence of social 
networks which reach more voters is badly needed. The mapping of dominant 
                                               
11 Our study indicates that pro-democracy actors tend to pick winning parties in their initial steps to 
look for political vehicles. The winning parties, however, are not interested in supporting them, so that 
they have to find small parties. 
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networks – either religious (church, mosque), family or ethnic groups based networks 
is proven to be effective. In the case of Pilkada in Manggarai, for example, the 
candidate used family based network to gain votes. In Serdang Bedagai, the pro-
democracy candidate employed society networks (peasants, labours).  
In regard to this fact, it is important to see the segment of the society who potentially 
gives the largest amount of vote. No doubt, that they are women and youth. By 
dominating the majority of the population, they have significant political basis.  
 
Patform in pilkada 
Through good mapping on local social-economy condition, some pro-
democracy candidates have successfully established the agenda of democratic 
governance regulation,  based on concrete needs. The platform is directed towards 
sustainable development, basic interest (such as scheme on free education and health 
service), APBD (Local Budget) policy reform and public service reform.   
 In East Belitung – Basuki Cahaya Purnama – Khairul Effendi raised the issue of 
the future of tin mining in East Belitung as the key issue to catch voters’ attention. 
This problem has been very significant and closely related to East Belitung people, 
who, for years have been relying their life on the nature resource. Other programs 
campaigned by the pair candidates were realistically designed free health care and 
education. 
It is important to note that similar  programs  were also adopted by other 
actors who did not have interest in promoting democracy. The problems, then, were 
related to the ability and the capacity to implement the program. In regard to this, it is 
important to consider that even pro-democracts finally won the election, they had to 
face the dominant political power in parliament, bureaucracy and limitation of 
municipality authority 
If Pilkada system– which relies on popular figures and party’s DPP – does not 
change, pro-democracy movements need to establish platforms with some parties or 
individual (independent candidate). 
Pilkada reform 
- In order to enable social groups to nominate their own candidate and establish 
their own agenda through the already established political system, alternative national 
political party is required. The party should enable citizens and constituents to control 
party’s officers at the local level. 
- Pro-democracy movement needs to establish political platform to promote the 
involvement of local political party in local election (pilkada) 
- Independent candidate must have ability to build more rooted power which is 
able to compete with dominant political power in DPD and bureaucracy level. 
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Special Experience Learnt from Aceh Program 
Demos’ research – which was conducted with ISAI – in Aceh shows that there 
are 3 important political groups which determine political dynamic before local 
election in Aceh. The groups are Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM), political party 
and civic groups. Each groups nominate their candidates (Aceh Pilkada system 
approves the nomination of independent candidate). GAM is a political actor which 
seriously attempts on transforming itself to be a local formal political party. 
The possibility to nominate independent candidate provides a meaningful 
political sphere for actors’ participation in political arena. Not only GAM which use 
it, but also other pro-democracy actors. In the recent Pilkada, GAM nominated its 
independent candidates both at province or city/municipality level. 
GAM’s capacity as electoral power can not be neglected although at provincial 
level GAM seems fragmented. On the one hand it builds coalition with SIRA (Sentra 
Informasi Referendum Aceh) at provincial level, on the other hand, with Humam 
Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah (often known as H2O) Yet, Irwandi Yusuf and 
Muhammad Nazar, successfully won with almost 40% of the votes at provincial level. 
At municipality level, 7 of 18 candidates they nominated also won. 
The civic groups, on the other hands, failed and thus clearly show 
fragmentation that occurred amongst them.  In the past Pilkada, they used opened 
democratic space by nominating their candidates to compete in Pilkada at 
city/municipality level. They also attempted to transform mass mobilisation 
movement that has been their potential power; into parliamentary movement by 
preparing local party and becoming the member of the expert team of new Aceh 
government. 
The fragmentation that happened among non-political organisation activists 
looked prominent when several civil society groups became members of expert team 
of several different governor candidates, without any agreement between them before. 
PRA (Partai Rakyat Aceh) supported Ghazali Abbas – Salahuddin Alfatta, SIRA 
supported Irwandi – M Nasar, while KPO-PA Humam Hamid – Hasbi Abdullah. 
More than that, there has been no interest based people organisation (peasant, labour 
and fishermen organisation) emerged.  
 
4. ATTEMPTS TO REFORM LAW ON POLITICAL PARTIY (LEGAL 
REFORM ) 
 
The existing regulations that regulate the political process in Indonesia is criticised by 
many as not accommodating the true democratic interests. This regulation, to some 
extend, influences democratisation process as elite dominant actors are still controlling 
the process by monopolising, using and abusing democracy rights and institutions for 
their own interests.  
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On the other hand pro-democratic activists are reluctant to engage in political sphere.  
As various studies and researches suggest, there are efforts and strategies of pro-
democratic actors to shift their attentions to social movement consolidation and link it 
to political movements. Such efforts would allow them to get the control of 
democracy process back, either in political and social arenas, and so be able to re-
determine the direction of democratisation process.  
The pro-democratic activists are nevertheless facing difficulties to fulfil the formal legal 
procedures. The law, for example, only accommodates candidates supported by existing 
‘legal’ political parties to engage in Pilkada.  Those who are not selected from such 
parties are not allowed to run for Pilkada candidacy. The legal system does not recognise 
local political parties either. These problems have limited opportunities for such pro-
democratic activists to participate in political sphere. 
 
In regard to the situation, the study aims to answer the following questions: to what 
extend do the legal instruments support/obstruct/empower democratisation from below? 
How should the legal instruments regulate the political system in order to support 
democracy movements? 
 
Why does this study focus on attempts to reform law on political party? There are indeed 
many researches on this issue –especially on legal aspects of election and Pilkada, while 
very few –if not none– pay attention to the important role of political parties in the issue 
of representation. Recently, political parties are the only legal institution competing in the 
election, including presidential election –because candidates must be supported by certain 
political parties. The situation is similar in Pilkada, which doesn’t recognise independent 
candidates. It is therefore clear that parties have significant role in political 
representation.  
 
Another reason to focus on political parties is that there are some formal regulations 
and development of political parties in Indonesia post Soeharto era worth studied. On 
the one hand it allows the evolvement of political parties from three corporatist 
political party to 48 in 1999 election. On the other hand it does not indicate an 
increase in the representation quality. Less than half succeeded in obtaining a seat in 
the DPR. 21 parties were successful to gain seats, while the remaining 27 do not obtain 
any.12 At the time only two new parties whose births were more or less affected by the 
political reform process that were conducted in 1998, namely PKB and PAN.  
Other reason why this study focus on political party is the increase of people’s 
disbelief to political party. In one of the polls conducted by the Kompas newspaper in 
                                               
12 Miriam Budiardjo,  1999 Election and lessons for the 2004 elections, The Working paper was submitted 
during the Round Table Discussion 1999 Election: Evaluation and its Reform conducted by Cetro (Center 
for Electoral Reform) on 9 September 1999. 
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2001, only around 8% of the people believe in their representation at the DPR.13  This 
is caused by the existence of gap between voters’ aspiration and political party’s 
attitudes and actions.  A survey conducted by LSI (Indonesia Survey Institution) 
concluded that seven (7) out of ten (10) argue that the exixting political parties do not 
represent public ideas and interests. This may explain why number of votes for large 
parties decreased in the last 2004 general election, while number of votes for relatively 
small parties like Partai Kesejahteraan Sosial, Partai Damai Sejahtera and Partai 
Demokrat increased.   
The initial findings of this study attempts to delve perceptions and views from various 
pro-democracy actors on the decisive factor of the representation problem. Apart from 
that, the perception of the pro-democracy actor is also related to the possible 
modifications which could be conducted to improve the quality of the representation. 
It derives from in depth interview, and focus group discussion organised in 6 cities 
(Jakarta, Solo, Kupang, Manado, Banjarmasin, and Medan). The participants of these 
events were pro-democratic actors with various background (workers, farmers, human 
rights, academicians, women groups, and especially politicians from various political 
parties). 
 
Several problems on political party, both external and internal, which Demos’ 
previous research identified, still exist. The problems include poor performance of  
party’s independence from money politics and from strong interest groups, party’s 
incapability to reflect on society’s vital issue and interest, the misuse of religious and 
ethnic sentiment by political party and political party’s incapability to run governance 
system. 
This situation gets worse  by  the lack of constituent’s capacity to control party. 
Several informants stated that political party was not able to conduct political 
education. On the other hand, it builds a patron-client relationship and figure-based 
leadership in its relation with its constituent.. In practice, such structure is reflected 
through the forming of Satuan Tugas (Security Squad) which only serves to protect the 
interest of party’s elites and limit mass initiative. With such a structure, lobby 
mechanism and financial power become the only institutionalised systems. 
Other implication of the existence of strong prominent figure role in the party is the 
lack of development of  systematic and organizational mechanism to solve internal 
party conflicts. As described by one of the informants, in order to formulate 
consensus, to solve problems and to settle independent interest offences between 
members,  parties depend on certain individuals to decide.14  There are indeed still 
                                               
13 As quoted in Sulistyo, Hermawan, “Electoral politics in Indonesia: A Hard Way to Democracy“  in  Electoral Politics in 
South East and East Asia, (Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Office for Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia, 
2002), page 89-90 
14 Interview with Eva Sundari, member of DPR from fraction of PDIP, in Jakarta,  on 22 November 2006. 
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opportunities to communicate it with the party line of leaders, but in practice there is 
no institutional mechanism to solve problems between members or the leaders, except 
in relation to very substantial violations on the party statutes and party household. 
This is due to the fact that there is always an inner cycle as the first layer of the general 
leader figure who maintain unlimited access to determine the persons wanting to meet 
or extend matters to the chief chairman. This means that if an organizational route 
will be taken, then this layer should be passed first. Accordingly more time is needed 
to solve problems.  
Several informants argued that most of political parties in Indonesia did not grow from 
interest groups. Therefore, the linkage between political party and mass organisations 
are not well established. Unfortunately, the Law No.2/1999 on Political Party, which 
is later amended with the Law No.31/2002, never requires political party to have 
interest group based membership. According to the Law, the party legal status is 
determined by the fulfilment of legal administrative requirements rather than of 
substantial requirements. Both civil and people organisations do not only need to 
improve their political capacity to conduct negotiation with political party, but also 
strive to get legal justification to intervene the process of decision making in political 
parties. 
The matter of women representation is also another problem to which we need to 
pay attention. It is important to consider the matter of women representation on two 
levels. First, at the real level where women are the segment which has the largest 
constituents, and therefore, the largest vote source, and second, in regard to  provide 
‘voice for the voiceless’. Therefore, to some informants, it is important to consider the 
quota for women in parliament, since women’s presence is expected to promote 
substantial representation to raise the issue of gender and unjust treatment to women.  
Yet, in terms of legal achievement, there are many laws regulating several women’s 
issues such as Law on Violation of Abuse within Household (KDRT), Law on 
Children Protection (UU Perlindungan Anak), and Law on Human Trafficking (RUU 
Perdagangan Manusia) and political party’s obligation to nominate women in 
legislative assembly at least 30% of the whole number of legislative members. The 
existence of the laws is, no doubt, a great achievement. Yet there are still problems on 
its implementation. Besides, the Law on Political Party does not explicitly state the 
matter of women representation. To maximise the function of political party as an 
institution of representation, therefore, it is important for the Law on Political Party 
to include the matter of women representation in political party. 
The next matter to discuss is electoral threshold (abbreviated to ET), which is not 
regulated in the Law on Political Party, but in the Law on General Election. ET has a 
very great influence to the improvement of the quality of political party. ET is often 
interpreted as the minimum votes a political party requires to participate in the next 
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general election. 15 This definition is not commonly used in the world. In Germany, 
for example, ET is understood as minimum vote a candidate or political party requires 
to gain seats in parliament. The misinterpreted definition applied in Indonesia, then, 
leads to the prohibition for political parties that do not successfully pass the minimum 
vote to participate in the next general election. The most usual solution for this 
problem is changing party’s name. 
Those who support ET argue that political parties that have similar vision may be 
united, thus implying on the simplification of political party. Too many parties will 
only create problems for society. Moreover, the system will not go along with pure 
presidential system. The ET’s percentages tend to increase. In 1999 election, the 
number went to 2%, then increase to 3% in the next election. There has been a popular 
discourse among politicians and government officers to increase the number into 5% 
for 2009 general election. 
Implications expected by the initiators of the regulation do not happen. Our research 
suggested on three negative implications. First, party discipline does not occur. Instead, 
many politicians move to other political party, because their supportive party does not 
pass ET requirement. Second, the representation of interest groups dissappear. Partai 
Damai Sejahtera (PDS) successfully placed its 332 cadres in DPR/DPRD. Yet, such a 
number did not reach 3%, as ET required, to participate in the next election. In other 
words, PDS could not serve as a vehicle for its cadres in the next election. This could 
also happen to other political parties. Third, ET limits the possibility of the people to 
look for new parties to represent their interest and to be competitors of big parties. 
In this case, the discussion of ET refers to the opportunity to participate in election, 
not to the establishment of political party. Yet, ET actually refers to political party’s 
authority to represent the people’s or its constituents’ vital needs in the process of 
determining public policies. The construction of political party’s establishment has 
initially reflected the spirit of limitation by applying centralisation of political party. 
The regulation requires that political party can only be established by at least 50 
people. It should have local offices in at least 50% of the whole provinces in Indonesia 
and in 50% of the whole cities/ municipalities in each province. Kompas stated that 
the number might increase, as the revision of Law No.31/2002 was issued. According 
to the revision plan, a party should be established by at least a hundred people, 
supported by local offices in 66% of the whole province in Indonesia and in 75% of the 
whole cities/municipalities in each province. 
The strict requirement clearly creates difficulty for the establishment of new political 
parties. More than that, the requirement to place party’s national office in Jakarta does 
not only make the establishment of new parties difficult, but also violate the spirit of 
                                               
15 Art  9 Law No. 12/2003 on General Election. 
 25 
decentralisation as implied by the Law No.22/1999 on Local Governance. Thus, there 
has been suggestion to withdraw the regulation. 
As stated by Minister of Internal Affairs, Hari Sabarno, the establishment of national 
party is intended to limit the people’s initiative to establish political party. The idea is, 
indeed against human rights, especially the right to form organisation. The parliament 
(FPP) is afraid that multi-party system will make the process of recovery and decision 
making slow. In addition, the system is assumed to disturb the stability of governance 
system that will depend on the success of party coalition. 
Experiences of other countries suggest that political parties do not need to be national 
parties. Local parties, thus, are allowed to exist, which does not destroy the unity of 
the state in all of sudden. It does not disturb the stability of government either. Our 
study finds the high expectation of pro-democracy activists to make local parties exist 
and thus, eligible to participate in general election. There are several reasons for this 
argument: (a) local parties make the representation of local society possible, (b) local 
society may control the performances of local parties easily, (c) local parties are needed 
to stimulate national party to be more accountable.  
 
Reforming the Law on Politics 
 
1.   Both civil and people organisations need to improve political cooperation and 
capacity in order to intervene the process of public policy decision in political parties. 
Therefore, political parties need to develop healthy recruitment system.  
2.   The tendency of party simplification that leaves some big national parties existed 
do not promote democracy process and restore people’s trust in political party. 
Neither it promotes the bottom-up party building. Therefore, the requirement to 
establish Jakarta-based political party and the plan to increase the minimum number of 
local offices should be withdrawn. 
3.   On the other hand, there should be foundation for the establishment of 
democratic, accountable local parties, which struggle for the people’s need. Therefore, 
the base for the local party should be in province’s capital. The party is also allowed to 
attend election at province, city/municipality, and district level.  
4.   There should be  legal foundation for the authority of local parties to participate in 
national election through a federation of local parties. 
5.   In order to increase women participation and representation, 30% of either 
national or local party officers should be derived from one gender category. 
6.   The plan to require political party depositing billion rupiah will only limit popular 
representation. This requirement is also against rights to establish political parties. The 
party’s function to serve public is not determined by the amount of its budget, but by 
its capacity to represent the society’s vital needs. 
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7.   If political party fails to work on its main functions and misuse religious and ethnic 
sentiments, it should be prohibited to appear in mass media, especially in electronic 
media.  
 
 
5. PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS OF SCALING UP AND 
BUILDING DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 
According to Demos’ national survey of Indonesia’s democracy, the positive 
new freedoms and expansion of civil society have not generated operational tools to 
facilitate the rule of law, equal access to justice, social and economic rights and 
representative and accountable government. What problem is most important? Given 
that one wants to tackle the challenges in a democratic way and not resort to 
authoritarian solutions, the bottom-line is to improve representation of fundamental 
issues and conflicts in society. The most fundamental dilemma of representation, in 
turn, is the weak independent organisations to facilitate politically equal popular 
control of public affairs. At present, the linkages between public affairs and the people 
are mediated by dominant actors in control of, on the one hand, non-civic based 
communities (rooted in religion, ethnicity, family relations and the like), and, on the 
other hand, business and markets. This is also how they interact successfully with 
politicians and executives in control of state and government. Moreover, while the two 
most vocal forces, the neo-liberals and the advocates of Muslim valued based policies, 
have different concepts of freedom, they form an unholy alliance that constrains 
democracy by joint interests in reducing the public sphere – the former in favour of 
privatisation of public resources and the latter in favour of non-public religious 
community- and family based decisions.  
However, there are signs of increasing dissatisfaction among the people, and of 
lack of confidence among the elite. One example is the massive vote in Aceh for 
democratically oriented local forces as against the elitist Jakarta-based political parties. 
Another is that according to a recent opinion poll (by Lembaga Survey Indonesia), 
seven of ten Indonesians do not feel that any of the political parties represent their 
ideas and interests, especially not with regard to fundamental social and economic 
conflicts. Yet another is that the lack of public trust in the established parties is 
deemed to be so serious that the political elite now try to implement new laws in 
favour of populist presidentialism and their own monopolisation of the party system, 
making it increasingly difficult for people to generate their own improved means of 
representation from below. 
To develop a viable alternative, however, pro-democrats must also come to 
terms with their own problems. Based on Demos’ national survey, these may be 
illustrated by the poor links between, on the one hand, popular organisations and civil 
associations (LSMs), and, on the other hand, between both of them and organised 
politics.    
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The weak linkages between popular organisations and civil associations are 
about fragmentation of both organisations and concerns. The lack of public resources 
that would allow for general policies breeds special organisations, supported by 
divisive donors and vested interests, and giving voice to singular groups, interests and 
issues. While the popular organisations are thus factionalised, the civil associations are 
often ‘floating atoms’ without broad social base. There is no political framework for 
broad unity on the basis of mutual concerns when each issue and interest is deemed to 
be vital for the other. This in turn is related to the similarly weak linkages between the 
popular as well as civil forces on the ground and organised politics. The fragmented 
popular organisations and civil associations are unable to select their own joint 
representatives, and thus susceptible to increasingly divisive top-down, clientelist and 
populist politicians. 
These problems are not unique for Indonesia, but no ready-made solutions are 
available. In many countries, pro-democrats are in search for ways to move ahead. 
What are the vital experiences in Indonesia – and what can we learn from them?  
Travelling for a number of months with comparative perspectives on Demos’ 
studies in the rucksack, revisiting old informants (since the early-80s) and activists 
(from Aceh to the Moluccas) who use Demos’ conclusions, the author of this part of 
the report has asked two major questions:  How do you broaden and scale up your 
efforts? And, how do you build alternative representation?  
Early Results 
What are the tentative conclusions? Firstly, there are increasingly many 
attempts to bridge popular organisations and civil associations. With few exceptions 
(such as the Insan fisher folk association in Kotabaru, South Kalimantan), however, 
this is mainly by loose networking and coalitions on specific and timely matters, or the 
adding up specific issues, rather than by also generating and organising around 
integrated minimum platforms and agendas.  
Secondly, it is also more common that popular organisations and civil 
associations relate to politics. While some (like the peasants organisations in Batang, 
north Central Java) are now ready to engage in local politics, most of them hesitate to 
get deeply involved with reference to the risk of being co-opted and the fact that 
Popular Organisations  
Organised 
Politics 
Civil Associations  (LSMs) 
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people in general do not trust politicians. Hence, many groups (including several 
related to indigenous people) rather try to reform customary and religious movements 
and to reconcile conflicts by bridging cultures and communities through deliberation. 
Others (like many media activists and the Urban Poor Coalition) promote polycentric 
informal representation in relation to issues and concerns of various groups and 
communities, in addition to temporary joint actions behind crystallised core issues. 
Yet others (such as Forum Warga) promote deliberative links between communities 
and government, thus avoiding ‘rotten’ politicians and ‘dirty’ party politics – while 
many less communitarian pro-democrats (including human rights activists who work 
in the field and those inspired by the ideas of participatory budgeting) try to develop 
more civic and institutionalised linkages between popular interest groups and 
government. Crucially, however, most of these efforts remain related to specific issues 
and conflicts (or clusters of them), avoiding comprehensive organisation and bypassing 
the difficult questions of how to promote thoroughly democratic representation 
beyond direct links to the executives.  
Fourthly, the major possible exception is Walhi, which has been caught up by 
whether it should continue to rely on pressure and lobbying or initiate a green party – 
but which could perhaps agree on fostering a wide non-party political block by 
broadening the idea of sustainable development to a number of related groups and 
concerns. We shall return to this when discussing possible ways ahead. 
Fifthly, the similar but less organised and usually more top-down link between 
organised politics and popular and civil organisations when the latter form temporary 
coalitions behind clusters of political parties and popular figures (in everything from 
elections of desa leaders to bupatis and governors and parliaments on various levels). 
These parties and figures are usually deemed to be less corrupt and somewhat pro-
democracy oriented. Typically, some kind of public political contract is signed 
between the various parties involved about the general principles to be adhered to; 
contracts which equally typically are not really adhered to after the elections, as the 
loose and temporary coalitions lack capacity to keep accountable those being elected. 
Sixthly, the less fluid populist variant – the victorious independent candidates 
in the recent Pilkada elections in Aceh; candidates which in fact were not so 
independent but rooted in GAM and its civic partner SIRA. This have inspired a 
number of pro-democrats in other parts of the country to struggle for the rights of 
independent candidates to run in elections and to meanwhile try to promote the 
adoption as such candidates by established parties. It is important to remember, 
however, that it remains to build similarly strong movements in the rest of the 
country as well. And even in the case of Aceh were GAM and SIRA were sufficient to 
deliver votes, successful and accountable government calls for more sustainable and less 
reactive civic and interest based organisations. 
Seventh, the different attempt by popular and civil organisations to form their 
own  federation of local parties, PPR –Partai Perserikatan Rakyat, on the basis of core 
interests and related values (but not yet ideology) of subordinated groups and classes, 
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and their allies. By contrast to other parties, its candidates are to be rooted in the 
popular movements rather than in the party itself. While this bold effort to explore 
the local political space works well for a start in provinces like Bengkulu were there 
are no immediate competitors, the fact that the party still seem to rely more on 
popular and civil organisations than individual members may contribute to 
competition with other party building projects about the support of these 
organisations. At worst, this may generate additional fragmentation on the ground and 
the disengagement of a number of organisations. We shall return to ways out of this 
impasse. 
Eighth, while similar ideas are crucial among labour groups related to the pre-
party formation PRP – Perhimpunan Rakyat Pekerja, the vision of trade union 
advocate Muchtar Pakpahan to build a social democratic party based on ‘his’ union 
seem to have been stalled by problems of dominant leadership as well as the need to 
broaden the base beyond certain union(s) and rather narrowly defined issues of 
organised labour. 
Ninth, the wider attempt to partially transform the theory- and ideology 
driven leftist cadre party PRD–Partai Rakyat Demokratik into a national united front-
party Papernas–Partai Persatuan Pembebasan Nasional. By contrast to the more 
localised, broad interest- and not yet ideologically based PPR, this attempt by a 
number of more politically driven popular and civil organisations is more 
characterised by a combination of the classical leftist ‘front from above’ (between 
established organisations) and ‘front from below’ tactics (between groups and people 
that are rallied behind theoretically and ideologically derived minimum demands). 
While the proof of the pudding is the eating, Demos’ results indicate, however, that by 
contrast to the Philippines with its national party list system and ideological 
organisations, the Indonesian political space for pro-democrats may be related more to 
basic issues and interests on the local level. In addition, PRD faces the same problem as 
PPR – the risk that the competition for the support of various popular and civic 
organisations may cause additional fragmentation and disengagement. This might be 
even more serious in the case of Papernas, which at least partially tries to build its 
party-front ‘from above’. 
Finally one must add the various attempts by popular figures to form small 
‘fronts from within’ already established parties like PDI-P and PKB as well as by 
‘borrowing’ a small national party’s electoral permit in an area where this party has 
almost no presence. While the classical problem of such efforts is the top-down 
character and the risks of being co-opted, this may arguably be countered by the 
linking up with various social movements and civil associations (such as the attempts 
by Pergerakan Indonesia. So far, however, this author is not aware of any case where 
the such movements and associations have really been able to keep the popular figures 
democratically accountable. 
 
6. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS: POSSIBLE WAYS AHEAD? 
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Given that none of the experiments and strategies discussed in the previous 
sections are perfect, we may initiate a discussion on possible ways ahead based on a 
summary on what major problems need to be addressed.   
The obvious point of departure is the need to build alternatives to elitist 
mediation of peoples’ problems by focusing on the actual conflicts and interests on the 
local level. Probably this is also where the political system is less closed and the elite 
are less hegemonic than at the centre. On the ground, however, there is an additional 
need to broaden and scale up fragmented issues, groups and work in different 
communities as well as to add concrete political education. Such priorities in turn call 
for electoral engagements, as the need to mobilise votes is an indispensable incentive to 
create broad unity or at least broad co-operation.  
When engaging in elections, though, popular organisations and civil 
organisations must also be able to stand up against the local elite, keep whatever parties 
and politicians accountable and prevent hijacking of movements and groups for 
narrow political purposes. Again, this calls for autonomously organised unity on basic 
matters. We know from cases like the Philippines and India that the otherwise 
increasing fragmentation and party-clientelism will not only weaken the broad 
movements but also cause several groups and movements to rather shy away from 
politics. Besides, women stand much better chances to get involved and raise their 
concerns outside than inside the established parties.  
Similarly, popular and civil organisations need not only keep politicians 
accountable. They also need to develop extensive cooperation among themselves to 
put decisive direct pressure on the executives as well as to foster extra-parliamentary 
politics in relation to the increasingly many public matters that are excluded from 
conventional democratic control under the communitarian and neo-liberal reign.  
Finally, of course, both party-political and popular-cum-civil movements that 
wish to promote more democratic representation need to foster broadest possible non-
party-partisan unity to resist the current attempts at closing the political system and to 
rather promote more favourable laws and regulations. On the other hand, however, 
politically elected government and legislatures remain too important to be neglected 
and given free hands for the elite to dominate. Hence, party-political engagement is 
inevitable. Yet again, such political party work will remain weak if there is not also the 
broadest possible unity on general issues that pro-democratic party politicians can 
draw on as a base when being squeezed within ‘dirty politics’. In addition, party-
politicisation must not be so deep and intensive that it provokes widespread 
disengagement among popular and civic organisations.  
If most of this is accepted, the possible implications for how to move ahead 
may be summarised in several points.  
 
1. Establishment of intermediary political block 
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First, popular and civil organisations that need to broaden and scale up their 
work but do not want to enter into party politics may wish giving prime importance 
to the building of intermediary non-party political blocks on various levels. Groups 
within Walhi that are in favour of similar blocks have the potential to play a vital role 
as initiators together with many labour, farmer, urban poor, human rights, anti-
corruption and general pro-democracy groups (including by way of joint analysis of 
the local situation based on Demos’ method for participatory political mapping). 
Second, the same groups may consider initiating such political blocks around, firstly, 
physical public spheres (to meet, socialise, develop culture as well as popular political 
education), and, secondly, mini-platforms from local to central levels. Demos’ national 
survey indicates clearly, that the major problem should not be to rally behind rather 
comprehensive mini-platforms with local specifications.16 Rather, previous difficulties 
seem to relate to the level of organisation – either on the grassroots level with quite 
specific and separate issues and interests, or on the top-level of party-politics. The 
intermediary political block level may be a better option. 
Such political blocks must be established in various levels to broaden the scope of 
issues and interests and its geographical scale. Attempts to build the block must be 
initiated as soon as possible, started from available public sphere as a means to meet, 
socialise, develop culture as well as popular political education. Thus, the block may 
initiate a consolidation step for attempts to open the political system (as revolt against 
elites who attempt to close and limit political system) and promote improved popular 
representation. 
 
2. Improving the performance of political party and party system 
 
Third, the initiators may also wish that such political blocks can rally broadest 
possible resistance against the current attempts to close the political system, promote 
improved popular representation, and support and keep various parties and politicians 
accountable on the basis of integrated mini-platforms and joint block-organisations; 
organisations that work continuously (i.e. during elections as well as after elections), 
from the local to the central level.  
                                               
16 The most obvious candidates include the promotion of legal reforms for popular representation, human rights, 
sustainable development, gender equality, civic rights based pluralism, good governance, incl. transparency and anti-
corruption based on civic engagements, reform of education to favour these dimensions, agrarian reform, 
democratic regulation against excessive privatisations and colonial-like exploitation of natural resources, social and 
economic rights (incl. social security networks) in return for production oriented economic development 
(negotiated, upheld and governed by popular organisations, employers organisation and the government), public 
support for democratically co-operative employment and income generating local production in neglected sectors 
and areas, and international co-operation with like-minded organisations and countries. 
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Fourth, the political parties and politicians may instead focus on competing for 
individual members and voters behind more comprehensive programmes. In this way, 
political parties own more clear contractual relationship with their constituents. 
Political parties should work based on transparency and accountability principles, and 
create possibility for the control of constituents to party’s performance.  
Fifth, both politicians and political parties should be urged to increase women 
participation and representation in politics.  To prompt this agenda, we suggest the 
idea that 30% of party leadership board’s member come from one gender.  
Sixth, in order to change the design of party system, a serious effort is needed. 
We need to urge that the laws opened broad possibility for each citizen to establish 
political party without hampered by the requirement of money deposit, minimum 
number of party officers in local level, and a business firm owned by political party. 
Seventh, at the same time, in order to block several attempts that hamper 
representation from below, a formal regulation that allow the establishment of 
democratic and accountable local parties is needed.  This idea is based on the 
arguments that the existence of local party makes close connection between party and 
its constituents, facilitation of local popular representation and prevention of national 
political party centralism possible.  Local parties should be allowed to run in national 
election through joint or federation of local parties. 
Eight, as the spirit to build democracy from ‘below” rises and the possibility 
for people to participate in politics through local election is widely opened, political 
parties should not be the only channel for political competition to gain local head 
positions. The design of rules and regulations should open possibilities for non-party 
candidates (independent candidates) to have equal opportunity to participate in local 
heads election.  
 
CONCLUSION 
To realise that popular representation is the most urgent agenda to promote 
meaningful democracy is not the same as to say that it is an easy task to implement it. 
Although some local empirical experiments support attempts to promote popular 
representation at the national level, some obstacles remain.   
While local experiments to formulate strategies to expand issues and interests in 
order to build bottom-up representation continue, these must also be evaluated to 
identify problems and options of democratisation. This early executive summary 
report has hopefully provided rich enough data and material to provide a basis for such 
evaluations. The full reports will be available within the next few months at 
www.demosindonesia.org.  
